Sunday, March 24, 2013

The Permanent Exit





Americans have declared their exit strategy. They have announced that their terms of engagement in Afghanistan have changed. Troop withdrawal after more than a decade of fighting has begun. Is the war over? or is more remaining to be fought? Will the lessons drawn from 1989 when Soviet troops withdrew be put to use or will history repeat itself sometimes soon after 2014? Does Afghanistan have an exit strategy of its own?

The fundamental issue, over which this war was begun, was the felt need of the West towards integration of Afghanistan with the world communities, through building adequate governance capacities towards prosperity by gradually marginalising those who fish in troubled waters. All this was singularly aimed at making the world a safer place, through containing divisive forces on the soils of blood soaked Afghanistan that threatened global security. There are other perceptions taking rounds though. Going by the available evidence, resource hunting in this alien land does not seem to be a plausible reason because the beneficiaries of major resource acquisition till now have been only the countries whose soldiers never laid foot here. Strategic control of this territory too appears to be a debatable subject in this age of sophisticated technology and shortening distances. This controversy of intentions behind reasons of aggression in Afghanistan is perhaps because too much was invested in the military style of winning the war gradually losing sight of the fundamental issue – integration through development.

Exiting out of Afghanistan for the international community is a lot easier as compared to that of the Government of Afghanistan. The country needs to have an “exit strategy” to come out of this dreadful war once and for all. Does Afghanistan have ONE? Or is it going to repeat its historical mistakes yet again? If we wish to come out of the mess we are in, the war needs to intensify though with a different approach and priorities. What should be the nature of this war? Who are the enemies hence forth?

The three enemies strengthening divisive forces traditionally have been and remain poverty, corruption and illiteracy though some would argue for continued political interferences. Looking carefully, these interferences are a consequence of the above factors and not the other way round. Unsurprisingly, Afghanistan is ranked by the UN on the Human Poverty Index, with a value of 59.8%, the 135th among 135 countries for which the index has been calculated. It is 181th among 182 countries on the Human Development Index. Afghans have an average life expectancy at birth of 48 years, and their adult illiteracy rate is around 72%. No wonder institutions failed to take roots, be it political, economic or judicial. The deeply divided population continues to look for meaning in its identity as it finds rosy solace in identifying itself with groups that promise quick ways of amelioration. This promotes an overemphasized sense of honour and a dangerously blown out of proportion sense of entitlement.

However, it would be wrong to assume that rebuilding efforts have completely gone down the drain. For reasons associated with nature of fragile states where institutions and systems are at basic formative stage, the donors designed and implemented their programs through their own methods and procedures. The Afghanistan government, one of the key stakeholders in such projects, could not participate effectively as it is very difficult to have demand driven projects in an insecure and volatile environment where social or community mobilization is hardly possible. The aid projects therefore assumed the nature of being donor driven and supply driven instead of being demand driven. Non-involvement of the Government in identifying and leading priority areas for development further resulted in uneven distribution and allocation, often leading to crowding of programs in few areas and absence in other areas. It is estimated that during the period from 2002 to 2011 US$ 57 billion was spent in Afghanistan. Of this 90 percent were spent on projects directly implemented by donors according to World Bank, Country Program Evaluation Report.

Things have changed gradually though. Afghanistan’s estimated per capita Gross Domestic Product of $591 in 1390 (2011) is five times higher than the $123 per capita GDP of 10 years ago. Access to primary health care has increased from 9% of the population to more than 57%. Nearly 8,000 kilometres of national highways, regional highways and provincial roads have been built. Civil aviation services have also improved considerably connecting Afghanistan to all major hubs in the region. Access to electricity has increased by 250% and the national power utility has grown into a more efficient, well-managed corporation.  The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector has grown from almost no coverage in 2001 to 86% of Afghan residential areas. The Agriculture Sector has seen irrigated land, increase from 1.2 to 1.8 million hectares; wheat production has grown from 1.5 to 3.2 million tons; and the total horticulture area has grown from 75,000 to 120,000 hectares, increasing grape production by 69 percent and almonds by 195 percent.

Afghanistan’s economy remains strong with around 10% average annual growth since 2002. However, no pat on the back yet, there are multiple issues that pose serious challenges to development that we have just noted. Apart from tackling insecurity and widespread corruption’ much needs to be done on building key institutions that can support the growth trajectory. Poverty and illiteracy can easily dry up the thin visible progress leading to much dreaded crisis and conflict.

To consolidate the gains, building confidence amongst locals, expats and foreign investors is the key. This can come provided there is confidence to do business on fair and equitable manner. Experience from the last 30 years has revealed that competition amongst businesses has been beneficial for less developed countries, as markets have opened up leading to more products and more jobs. Competition also brings in transparency and accountability in government-business relationship. Linkage between “competition” and “poverty reduction”- which is central to ills in Afghanistan, is rather simple to establish. Small producers if are considered as consumers of ‘inputs’ and ‘infrastructure services’ then any interventions by the  government in improving competition in these markets would help these producers and hence propel further growth. Thus, there are enormous possibilities for competition to address poverty by improving access to services and creating jobs. One of the definitions of poverty is the absence of an individual from a market because they simply can’t afford to operate in it. Thankfully, a number of countries, most notably South Africa and Senegal, are examples of how new entry in market encouraged by competition policy can help widen access and bring more poor consumers into markets. Learning from these experiences, it is time Afghanistan starts investing in building institutions that promote and protect “fair trade”, in markets that ensures fairplay.

Perhaps the biggest challenge in Afghanistan will be in finding ways to make this happen at the soonest. Here lies the “Permanent Exit Strategy” of Afghanistan that will restore it to its recently lost glory. This will allow the world to feel safer averting the unlearnt mistakes of 1989 and that which was airdropped after 9/11.

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